



Assessment of Militancy Activities on Rural Dwellers in Delta State, Nigeria

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Keywords : *Militancy Activities, farming experience, Multinational Oil Companies, developmental projects, Sustainable development.*

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ASSESSMENT OF MILITANCY ACTIVITIES ON RURAL DWELLERS IN DELTA STATE, NIGERIA

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Assessment of Militancy Activities on Rural Dwellers in Delta State, Nigeria

O.R. Ashimolowo (Ph.D)^α, Odiachi G.N.^Ω

Abstract - Militant activities in the oil-rich Delta region have been wanton and continuous with dire health, social and economic consequences for its people, for over three decades. The study assessed militancy activities in rural areas of Delta State, Nigeria. Study was carried out using multistage sampling technique to draw respondents from the three zones of Delta State Agricultural Development Programme. Respondents were selected from seven (7) cells located within five (5) blocks namely Oshimili South, Aniocha, Ughelli South, Warri North, Warri South. Farmers within each community were selected purposively, making a total of seventy (70) respondents. Both descriptive (frequencies and percentages) and inferential statistics (Chi-square and t-test) were used in data analysis. Result revealed that 75.71% of the respondents were males while 22.29% were females. Majority (60%) of the respondents had at least a secondary school education while 85.71% were married. Only 25.71% had over 25 years of farming experience with 32.86% having less than 1 hectare of farmland. Also, 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that the government should be blamed for the crises in the State while 41.31% strongly disagreed that militants are to be blamed. Nevertheless, 50% of the respondents agreed that Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCS) provided infrastructures for the area before amnesty. Furthermore, 37.14% of the respondents opined that militancy activities caused very little destruction of farmland. Moreover, 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that the government did the right thing by granting amnesty. Significant relationship existed between marital status ($\chi^2= 4.37$, $p=0.04$) and their perception of militancy activities in Delta State. Also, result revealed a significant relationship between the perception of rural dwellers on the MNOCS before and after the amnesty ($t=-1.90$) at 0.05. The study concluded that marital status of individual farmers affects their perception of the MNOCS. The study recommended that the government should create enabling policies towards enforcing developmental projects aimed at sustainable development and improved family lifestyles.

Keywords : Militancy Activities, farming experience, Multinational Oil Companies, developmental projects, Sustainable development.

I. INTRODUCTION

Militancy is a state or condition of being combative or disposed to fight for a cause or belief (Chindah and Braide (2000)). It can also

be defined as a violent response by an individual, group or sect in a region, community, state or nation due to claims of underdevelopment, political oppression, religious beliefs and segregation. The motive is that people want their rights and if they are not going to get it by negotiation, they simply will then have it by violence against the "powers that be".

The presence of oil resources in developing countries presents a large paradox (Shakleman, 2006). On one hand, oil and gas discovery make the eradication of poverty and the development of weak economies a possibility. An example of this is Angola which sees its burgeoning oil industry as a means of escaping poor economic conditions. On the other hand, the "curse of oil" is evident in many oil-rich countries worldwide with oil producing states showing a high incidence of corruption, violent conflicts, poor educational structure and health services and economic strength.

Delta state which is one of the nine states of the Niger-delta region is greatly endowed with abundant natural resources and a weather which supports all year round agricultural production. About fifty percent of the active labour force is engaged in one form of agricultural activity or another (cropping enterprise and fishing enterprise), with yam, cassava, plantain, maize, cocoyam, and vegetables as the predominant food crops grown by the farmers in the area. However, owing to the hydrographic conditions of the state, only a fraction of the land size is cultivated with crops. (Federal Office of Statistics, 1995). Farming practices are traditional, and the use of crude implements such as hoe and cutlasses predominate. Mechanization is on a very low scale and the use of modern farming inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides is limited because farmers hardly have access to it, since it is nationally distributed by the Federal Government.

Delta state is the largest crude oil producing state in the Niger-delta area and in Nigeria. Nigerian oil and gas industry generates over ninety percent of the nation's foreign exchange earnings. Paradoxically, in spite of the increasing revenue from crude oil exploration, the communities from which these resource flow in Delta state continue to live in conditions of social deprivation and abject poverty. This has led to militancy activities in the state.

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Oil was meant for the indigenes of Delta state. People's rights have come under severe assault by the ecologically unfriendly practices of the Multi-national Oil Companies (MNOC'S). In addition, state laws and policies as they relate to petroleum resources officially take away private property from indigenous people for public use denying them of their rights to their natural resources. Farming lands were collected by the Government and promises made to the communities have not been kept, and all form of agricultural activities was almost totally abandoned by the Government in this areas including funding. According to Brown (1998), the local economies of the oil producing communities have collapsed, and they are not integrated into the oil economy of the nation. The success of the all companies has not directly led to their own development.

With militancy in the state and region escalating, and disturbing Nigerian oil production, the government offered to give militants amnesty in return for laying down and surrendering their arms in October 2009.

II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Delta state has been embroiled in crisis between the government forces and militant groups that are aggrieved over certain fundamental issues affecting the region. Since the turn of a "new democracy" in 1999, militants intensified their fight with government forces, sabotaged oil installations (which has led to more oil spillages), taken foreign oil workers hostage and carried out lethal car bombings. At the root of the problem is a crisis of underdevelopment. The crisis was exacerbated by emergent issues of gross distortion of Nigerian federalism in respect to resource control, citizenship rights and environmental degradation. Unfortunately, the external manifestation has been mainly that of violent agitation, and criminal activities of some elements, taking advantage of the bad situation. Communities are in severe need for help as their youths see no more hope and end up joining these militant groups as they are very lucrative.

This led to government imposing security measures like curfew to reduce the rate of crime but also this affects the economic activities of these communities (agriculture, education, health, etc). The amnesty deal from October 2009 is failing, money allocated for training are not reaching the ex-militants as contractors skim huge profits for themselves, the oil companies continue to neglect the environment and needs of the community. The Nigerian Federal and state governments' commitment is limited to speeches and promises. The above mentioned scenario has affected agricultural activities within the area, leading to increased poverty among the farming households.

III. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

a) Broad Objective

The general objective of this study is the assessment of militant activities on rural dwellers in Delta-state, Nigeria.

b) Specific Objective

1. Examine the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents
2. Ascertain their perception on the causes of the militant crisis in the state.
3. Investigate the rural dwellers perception on the MNOC'S before and after the amnesty
4. Investigate the perception of the rural dwellers on effects of militant activities on their farming operations.
5. Determine the rural dwellers' perception of the amnesty granted to the militants by the Federal Government.
6. Ascertain the rural dwellers views on the end to crisis.

IV. HYPOTHESIS

H01 : The is no significant relationship between the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and their perceptions on militant activities in the state

Ho2 : The is a significant difference between the rural dwellers perception on the MNOC'S before the amnesty and after the amnesty

V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

a) Area of study

Delta State lies approximately between longitudes 5000E and 6045E of the Greenwich Meridian, and latitude 5000N and 6030N of the equator. It is one of Nigeria's extremely southern states, and covers an area of 17, 001Km²(Delta State Environmental Protection Agency, 1996).

Delta state consists of 25 local government areas. According to the Delta State Agricultural Development Programme (DSADP), these local governments have been grouped into three zones:

- (1) Delta-north, which has its headquarters in Agbor has nine local governments under it with most of them consisting of the Igbo speaking tribe. This area of the state has little or insignificant amounts of militant activities with kidnapping the major militant activity.
- (2) Delta-central, which has its headquarters in Effurun has ten local governments under it with most of them Urohbos by tribe. This area of the state suffers from spillover of militant activities from the highly volatile delta-south zone. This is where the amnesty camp for the rehabilitation of the militants is located.

- (3) Delta-south, which has its headquarters in Warri has almost all of the militant activities take place in the state. six local governments under it with the tribes being Urohbos, Ijaws and Itsekiri. This area is where




Figure. 1 : DSADP ZONAL MAPPING OF THE STATE

b) Sampling technique and sample size

Multistage sampling technique was used to draw samples for the study. There are three zones within the Delta State Agricultural Development programme (DSADP). In DSADP structure, there are 25 blocks, each block consists of 8 cells, and each cell consists of 8 groups while each group consists of 10 farmers. The blocks selected were Warri north and Warri south (Delta

south zone), Ughelli north and Ughelli south (Delta central), and Oshimili south (Delta north zone). The communities within the cells that were selected are Tsekeleooou, Koko, Abigborode, Odeitsekiri, Warri, Omadina, Otu-jeremi, Oginibo, Okwe, Ogwashi-ukwu, Ukwuoba based on their farming nature as well as frequency of militancy activities.

Table 3.1 : Sampling technique of respondents

Zones	Blocks	Cells	Communities	Number of respondents
Delta north	Oshimili south	8	Okwe	8
	Aniocha south	8	Ogwashi-ukwu	6
		8	Ukwuoba	4
Delta central	Ughelli south	8	Otu-jeremi	10
		8	Oginibo	12
Delta south	Warri north	8	Tsekeleooou	6
			Koko	4
			Abigborode	5
	Warri south	8	Odeitsekiri	4
			Warri	7
		Omadina	4	
Total				70

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

a) Socio-economic characteristics of the rural dwellers

Table revealed that 75.71% of the respondents were males while 22.29% of the respondents were females. This means most of the farmers in the study area are males. This may be due to the feminization of farming as most men go in search of the white collar jobs in urban areas and probably militancy activities. This could contribute to an increase in female headed household.

Table also revealed that 34.29% of the respondents fall between the age group of 41-50 years while 25.71% are 31-40 years. About 18.57% of them are above 50 years of age. The result indicates that most of the respondents are young. The fact that youths constitute a greater percentage of the workforce could be an indication of more capable hands on the farm. It could also be a reason for the high percentage of youth involved in militancy in the study area.

Educational status revealed that 60% of the respondents had at least secondary school. Also, 1.43% of the respondents did not complete primary school, 21.43% of the respondents did not complete secondary school while 12.86% attended tertiary school with 4.29%

of them not completing their programme. An alarming 11.43% had no formal education. This means the respondents are relatively literate. This could have effect on the perception of their rights. This study supports the assertion of Mukagbo (2004) that it is the very few that are opportuned to be educated from the region are the voices of the people.

Marital status shows that 85.71% of the respondents are married while 14.29% of them are single. This may be due to the societal belief in early marriage which is one of the characteristics of rural communities. This means that most of the respondents are responsible due to their marital status.

Also, 51.43% of the respondents have a household size of between 5-8 and 11.43% have a household size of 8 and above. This means most of the households have a relatively large household size. This could be as a result of need for more hands on the farm. Thus supporting the preponderance of large family sizes among the poor in rural areas of Nigeria (Eboh 1995).

Farmers that participated in both crop and livestock production were 32.86%, while crop farmers were 47.14%, livestock farmers were 20%. Hence, most of the farmers in Delta State are into crop farming, while

integrating with livestock. The farmers practice crop production as well as fish farming due to the riverine nature of the area.

The respondents had farming experience with 25.71% having above 25 years and 24.29% having between 21-25years farming experience. Only 5.71% of the respondents had below 10 years farming experience. This means that most of the farmers have been practicing the profession for a long time. This could be as a result of low level of education of the respondents and involvement in farming activities at a tender age.

Nonetheless, 63% of the respondents had no family member working with the MNOC'S. This means a few number have family members working with MNOC'S. Those who had no family members working with the MNOC'S could be as a result of their poor educational qualifications.

Most of the farmers had small farm sizes with 32.86% of them having less than 1hectare and 28.57% having between 1-1.5hectares. This indicates that farmers have small land holdings. This may either be as a result of their low income and unavailability of cultivable land as a result of land degradation.

Table 1 : Distribution of respondents by socio-economic characteristics (n=70)

Variables	Categories	Frequency	percentage
Sex	Male	53	75.71
	Female	17	24.29
Age(years)	21-30	15	21.43
	31-40	18	25.71
	41-50	24	34.29
	51-60	9	12.86
	60 and above	4	5.71
Education status	No formal education	8	11.43
	Primary	6	8.57
	Secondary	28	40.00
	Tertiary	9	12.86
	Uncompleted primary	1	1.43
	Uncompleted secondary	15	21.43
Marital status	Single	10	14.29
	Married	60	85.71
Household size	1-4	26	37.14
	5-8	36	51.43
	8 and above	8	11.43
Occupation of respondents	Livestock	14	20.00
	Crop	33	47.14
	Both	23	32.86
Farming experience group(years)	Below 10	4	5.71
	10-15	15	21.43
	16-20	16	22.86
	21-25	17	24.29
	Above 25	18	25.71
Family working with MNOC'S	Yes	26	37.14
	No	44	62.86
Community status	Adviser to village chief	3	4.29
	Head of farmer group	18	25.72
	Member of village council	38	54.29
	Village head	2	2.86
	None	9	12.86

b) *Perception of rural dwellers on causes of crisis*

Results indicated that 50.00% strongly agreed that the government is to be blamed for the militant crisis in Delta State, 51.43% strongly agreed that MNOC was insensitive to the plight of the masses while only 38.57% strongly agreed that the high rate of the unemployed youths is responsible for militant activities.

Also, 41.43% strongly disagree that militants are to be blamed while 47.14% agree that oil spillage on farmland and destruction of production site is the cause of the crisis. This means that most of the respondents see the government and the MNOC'S as the cause of the militant crisis in the state.

Table 2: Distribution of respondents based on their perception of cause of crisis (n =70)

Variables	SD	D	A	SA
Government is to be blamed	1(1.43)	4(5.71)	30(42.86)	35(50.00)
MNOC'S insensitivity to the plight of respondents	3(4.29)	12(17.14)	19(27.14)	36(51.43)
Traditional rulers are to be blamed for the militant crisis	22(31.43)	37(52.86)	9(12.86)	2(2.86)
Militants are to be blamed	29(41.43)	30(42.86)	4(5.71)	7(10.00)
Lack of physical development in the rural areas is the bone of contention	1(1.43)	3(4.29)	19(27.14)	47(67.14)
High rate of unemployed youths in the rural areas was a casual factor	0(0)	8(11.43)	35(50.00)	27(38.57)
Oil spillage on farmland and destruction of production site	2(2.86)	11(15.71)	33(47.14)	24(34.29)

SD = strongly disagree, D = Disagree, A = Agree, SA = strongly agree

Percentage in parenthesis

c) *Rural dwellers perspectives on MNOC'S before the amnesty and after the amnesty*

Results from the study indicate that 50.00% of the respondents agreed that MNOC'S provided infrastructure for the area before the amnesty, while 24.29% strongly disagreed. Nonetheless, 38.57% disagree that MNOC'S provided better healthcare. On the receipt of adequate compensation for destroyed properties, 30.00% of the respondents strongly disagreed. Also, 41.43% Of the respondents agreed that MNOC'S provided jobs for the rural dwellers while 18.57% of the respondents strongly disagree that scholarships were provided. This means that MNOC'S try to meet their societal obligation to the ruralites. If encouraged, this could have an impact on reduction of crisis in the region.

Only, 37.14% of the respondents agree that the MNOC'S are responsible for the death of livestock and fishes, while 25.72% of the respondents strongly disagree that the MNOC are responsible for the deaths of indigenes through pollution and 31.43% and 22.86% of the respondents respectively agree and strongly agree respectively that the MNOC are responsible for the deaths of indigenes through pollution. Also, 40.00% agree that they recorded low harvests as a result of the activities of MNOC'S. This indicates that MNOC'S are responsible for some crisis recorded in the farming enterprise. This could have implication on their continuous presence in the region.

In terms of provision of infrastructure after the amnesty, 42.86% of the respondents disagree that infrastructure has been provided, 48.57% disagree that better healthcare has been provided, 42.86% of the respondents strongly disagree that rural dwellers received adequate compensation for destroyed properties and 47.14% of the respondents disagree that the MNOC'S provided jobs for the rural dwellers. Meanwhile, 37.14% of the respondents agree that MNOC'S provide scholarships for the students in the area, 37.14% of the respondents agree that MNOC'S are responsible for the death of livestock and fishes, 31.43% agree that the MNOC'S are responsible for the deaths of indigenes through pollution, while 47.14% of the respondents agree that low harvests have been recorded as a result of MNOC'S activities. This could mean that amnesty has had significant impact on the provision of infrastructures in the region. This might lead to reduced conflict due to the gainful employment of youth.

Table 3 : Distribution of respondents' perception on MNOC'S before and after the amnesty (n=70)

Variables	Before				After			
	SD	D	A	SA	SD	D	A	SA
They provided infrastructure for the area.	18(25.72)	17(24.29)	35(50.00)	0(0)	28(40.00)	30(42.86)	10(14.29)	2(2.86)
They provided better healthcare.	15(21.43)	27(38.57)	26(37.14)	2(2.86)	19(27.14)	34(48.57)	16(22.86)	1(1.43)
Rural dwellers received adequate compensation for destroyed properties.	21(30.00)	21(30.00)	25(35.71)	3(4.29)	30(42.86)	24(34.29)	14(20.00)	2(2.86)
MNOC'S provide jobs for rural dwellers.	13(18.57)	25(35.71)	29(41.43)	3(4.29)	18(25.71)	33(47.14)	18(25.71)	1(1.43)
Provision of scholarships for students.	12(17.14)	24(34.29)	31(44.29)	3(4.29)	18(25.71)	23(32.86)	26(37.14)	3(4.29)
Supply of school materials and buildings.	14(20.00)	22(31.43)	32(45.71)	2(2.86)	13(18.57)	26(37.14)	30(42.86)	1(1.43)
MNOC'S are responsible for the death of livestock and fisheries.	11(15.69)	21(30.00)	26(37.14)	12(17.14)	12(17.14)	15(21.43)	26(37.14)	17(24.29)
MNOC'S are responsible for the death of indigenes through pollution.	20(28.57)	22(31.43)	18(25.71)	10(14.29)	18(25.71)	14(20.00)	22(31.43)	16(22.86)
They provided better education for the community	18(25.71)	18(25.71)	33(47.14)	1(1.43)	18(25.71)	33(47.14)	17(24.29)	2(2.86)
Low harvests recorded as a result of MNOC'S.	9(12.86)	18(25.71)	28(40.00)	15(21.43)	10(14.29)	11(15.71)	33(47.14)	16(22.86)

SD= Strongly disagree, D= Disagree, A= Agree, SA= Strongly Agree
Percentages in parenthesis

d) *Perception of the rural dwellers on effect of militant activities on farming operations*

Result further shows that 37.14% of the respondents believed that the militant activities caused very little destruction of their farmland, while 24.29% said the militant activities caused very much destruction of their farmland. Also, 48.57% of the respondents said militant activities made transportation of workers and harvested crops a little difficult, while 14.29% said it affected them very much. This means militant activities has affected farming operation in the region. This could lead to low harvest, high cost and scarcity of agricultural products.

Results also showed that 42.86% of the respondents said the militant activities affected the marketability of their products a little, while 20.00% said it affected them very much. Moreover, 47.14% of the respondents said militant activities affected the visits of extension agents very much. For labour on the farm, 40.00% of the respondents opined that militant activities affected them little while only 17.14% said it affected them very much. This means MNOC's activities has adversely affected the livelihood of the farming population.

Table 4 : Distribution of rural dwellers based on their perception of effect of militant activities on farming operation (n=70)

Variables	VL	L	M	VM
Militant activities caused destruction of farmland	26(37.14)	16(22.86)	11(15.71)	17(24.29)
Militant activities made transportation difficult	12(17.14)	34(48.57)	14(20.00)	10(14.29)
Militant activities made marketability of products difficult	7(10.00)	30(42.86)	19(27.14)	14(20.00)
Militant activities affected the visits of extension workers	11(15.71)	8(11.43)	18(25.71)	33(47.14)
Militant activities affected labour on the farm	14(20.00)	28(40.00)	16(22.86)	12(17.14)
Timing of harvests was disrupted by militant activities	10(14.29)	35(50.00)	19(27.14)	6(8.57)
Loss of animals and aquatic products	24(34.29)	25(35.71)	11(15.71)	10(14.29)

VL = Very little, L = Little, M = Much, VM = Very much
Percentage is in parenthesis

e) *Rural dwellers views on amnesty*

Results indicated that 50.00% of the respondents strongly agreed that government did the right thing by granting the militants amnesty, while 58.57% of the respondents agreed that the militants did the right thing by accepting the amnesty granted by the government. Also, 60.00% of the respondents disagree that the amnesty programme was badly setup, 44.29% of the respondents disagree that the amnesty has enhanced overseas training, 41.43% of the respondent disagree that the amnesty has improved healthcare facilities and other infrastructures, 32.86% disagree that the amnesty has increased the scale of production of their enterprise, 54.29% of the respondents strongly

agree that the amnesty has reduced considerably, fear and tension in Delta state and 34.29% of the respondents strongly disagree that kidnapping in the region has increased as a result of the amnesty. This means amnesty has generated a lot of controversies in the region as some had positive and negative views on the programme. This could have implication on the success of the programme. This supports findings of Gaugran(2009) that the Niger Delta provides a stark example of the lack of accountability of a government to its people, and MNOC'S almost total lack of accountability when it comes to the impact of their operations on the rural dwellers.

Table 5 : Distribution of rural dwellers views on amnesty (n=70)

Variables	SD	D	A	SA
Government did the right thing to grant the amnesty.	0(0)	2(2.86)	33(47.14)	35(50.00)
Militants did the right thing by accepting the amnesty granted.	1(1.43)	3(4.29)	41(58.57)	25(35.71)
Amnesty programme was badly set up.	10(14.29)	42(60.00)	9(12.86)	9(12.86)
Amnesty has led to improved education for the populace.	14(20.00)	20(28.57)	31(44.29)	5(7.14)

Overseas training has been enhanced by the amnesty programme.	24(34.29)	31(44.29)	15(21.43)	0(0)
Improved healthcare facilities and other infrastructure	17(24.29)	29(41.43)	24(34.29)	0(0)
Increase in the scale of production of rural dwellers enterprise.	9(12.16)	23(32.86)	27(38.57)	11(15.71)
Fear and tension in the area has reduced considerably as a result of the amnesty	1(1.43)	5(7.14)	26(37.14)	38(54.29)
Host community is in danger as a result the camping of the militants.	30(42.86)	24(34.29)	11(15.71)	5(7.14)
Kidnapping in the region has increased in the region as a result of the amnesty	24(34.29)	22(31.43)	18(25.71)	6(8.57)

SD = strongly disagree, D = Disagree, A = Agree, SA = strongly agree
Percentage in parenthesis

f) Rural dwellers views on end to crisis

Results indicated that 61.43% of the respondents agreed that the amnesty programme has brought an end to the militant crisis and 15.71% of the respondents strongly agreed. Also, 55.71% of the respondents agreed that the amnesty has brought peace finally to the communities involved and 37.14% of the respondents agreed that the amnesty has made the militants repentant, while 57.14% of the respondents agreed that government will keep to its own side of the bargain of the amnesty and only 12.86% of the

respondents strongly disagree that government will keep to their own side of the bargain. This means respondents are apprehensive of the success of amnesty

Results further shows that 67.14% of the respondents agree that militants will keep to their own side of the bargain, while 91.43% of the respondents strongly agree that failure to keep to the conditions of the amnesty could trigger off a fresh crisis. This could mean that the crisis has not yet ended in the region.

Table 6 : Distribution of Rural dwellers views on end to crisis (n=70)

Variables	SD	D	A	SA
Has brought an end to the militant activities	2(2.86)	14(20.00)	43(61.43)	11(15.71)
Has brought peace finally to the communities involved	1(1.43)	12(17.14)	39(55.71)	18(25.71)
Has made the militants actually repentant	15(21.43)	24(34.29)	26(37.14)	5(7.14)
Militants will keep to their own end of the bargain	9(12.86)	19(27.14)	40(57.14)	2(2.86)
Failure to keep to the conditions of the amnesty could trigger off a fresh crisis	3(4.29)	13(18.57)	47(67.14)	7(10.00)

SD = strongly disagree, D = Disagree, A = Agree, SA = strongly agree
Percentage in parenthesis

Table 7 : Chi-square analysis of respondents socio economic characteristics and their perception of militancy activities in Delta state

Socio economic characteristics	χ^2	Df	P	Decision
Sex	0.46	1	0.49	NS
Age	4.30	4	0.37	NS
Education	3.29	6	0.77	NS
Marital status	4.37	1	0.04	S
Household size	3.43	2	0.18	NS
Occupation	2.15	2	0.34	NS
Farming experience	7.51	4	0.11	NS
Family working with MNOC	0.49	1	0.48	NS
Membership of farmers organization	5.36	4	0.25	NS
Farm size	2.24	5	0.81	NS
Community status	7.01	4	0.54	NS

H01: There is no significant relationship between the socio economic characteristics of the respondents and their perception on militant activities in the state.

Result of Chi-square analysis indicated a significant relationship between marital status (=4.37)

and the perception of respondents on militant activities at $p \leq 0.05$. This means that the marital status of the respondents would determine their perception of militant activities. This means for instance that a married respondent could perceive militancy as bad due to its effect on their family.

Table 8 : Relationship between perception of rural dwellers on the MNOC'S before the amnesty and after the amnesty

Variable	N	Df	Mean	Std Dev	t-value	P	Decision
Perspective Before	70	138	23	4.25	-1.90	0.05	Sig
After	70	137	21.67	4.01	-1.90	0.05	Sig

Source : Field survey 2010

H02: There is a significant difference between the rural dwellers perception on the MNOC'S before the amnesty and after the amnesty

A significant difference was recorded between the perceptions of rural dwellers on the MNOC before ($t = -1.90$) and after ($t = -1.90$) the amnesty at $p \leq 0.05$. This means that the perception of the respondents on the MNOC activities differ before and after amnesty probably due to their conditions.

- 3) Rural dwellers should be better informed on the need for quality education so that they can get the jobs they feel they have a right too.
- 4) Government and the MNOC'S should involve the rural dwellers in project planning, implementation and policy making as they are the ones that know their needs the most.

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VII.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

a) Conclusion

The educational qualification and literacy level of the rural dwellers is still very low and nothing urgent is being done by the Government and stakeholders to solve this problem and therefore employment opportunities for the people of the region is limited since they do not have the necessary educational qualifications to get good jobs.

Also, the rural dwellers blame the Government and the MNOC'S for the crisis in the state and accuse them of not providing infrastructure, job opportunities, better education, better healthcare, degraded forests and farmland, clean enabling environment for living and a few of them also accuse them for the death of livestock, fishes and even relations through pollution. The amnesty granted to the militants and the reduction of violence and tension in the state has done little to improve and/ or solve the problems that led to the crisis in the first place. Although most of the people believe the amnesty was the right and best step to take, they still insist that the Government and the MNOC'S have not improved in terms of their commitment to the region.

b) Recommendation

- 1) Non-farm enterprises are a strategy by which the rural farming community in the state can cope with the decline in farmland availability and unemployment
- 2) Government interventions to develop rural social and economic infrastructure (transport, communication, health and education) and skills development are fundamental in creating peace in the state.